Category Archives: Fintech

Origins of Visa (and Payment Networks)

Originally posted as a Twitter thread on September 18, 2019


September 18th marks the 61st anniversary of the most valuable network effect of all time: the credit card. How did we get here? Read on. And read @opinion_joe ‘s book “Piece of the Action” for more…

The epicenter of the revolution was Fresno, California. Facebook started with the contained network of Harvard students; the humble credit card started with 60,000 people in Fresno and a prominent company called Bank of America, then a California-only bank.

There was no application. 60,000 people just got a BankAmericard in the mail on September 18, 1958, ready to use.

There were “charge cards” like Diner’s Club before the BankAmericard Fresno drop, but there was no “credit” being extended. And you could go to a bank and get a loan, or get an installment loan for a specific purchase, but in person.

The credit card came out of Bank of America’s corporate think tank, called the “Customer Services Research Department,” run by a 41 year old man named Joe Williams.

Consumers were used to paying on credit, but each line of credit was either specific to a merchant (e.g., Sears), or a burdensome process requiring a new loan (in person) from the bank.

Williams thought the credit card — a multi-merchant product — would fix that. It really had two purposes: convenience and lending.

Fresno at the time had about 250,000 people, and *45% of all Fresno families* were Bank of America customers.

Credit card fees were set at 6% for merchants, and consumers — who just randomly got this card without applying — got between $300 and $500 in instant credit.

The brilliance of the 60,000 person drop is that Williams had effectively started with the chicken, in the classic chicken/egg cold start problem. On day 1, cardholders simply *existed* which permitted BoA to sign up all merchants who didn’t have existing proprietary programs

So Williams started in a seemingly random, highly concentrated town, immediately enlisted existing customers, and focused on fast-moving, small merchants — not the giants like Sears — all backed by a massive advertising campaign.

More than 300 merchants in the city signed up, the first being Florsheim Shoes (still around!).

Within 3 months, BoA was expanding concentrically — to Modesto to the north and Bakersfield to the south, and within a year San Francisco, Sacramento, and Los Angeles. Within 13 months of Fresno, there were 2 million cards issued and 20,000 merchants onboarded.

After the Fresno drop, other banks followed. Chase Manhattan was 5 months later on the east coast.

Williams assumed that collections would be a breeze, that late payments would never cross 4%, and that existing bank credit systems would work. Instead, less than 2 years after Fresno, Joe Williams quit BoA due to a series of disasters. The credit card almost died then+there

Delinquencies were over 20%. Fraud was out of control as criminals figured out how to replicate cards. Merchants (harbinger of things to come) hated paying 6% and the first battles over fees began. Some of them stole from the bank or customers, too.

And more broadly — and this is now illegal — simply giving people cards without having them apply, and without them understanding the consequences of wanton spending, created far more bad debt than BoA had ever seen (on a customer % basis).

The huge losses and mounting pressure almost caused BoA to kill the card program altogether. The founder was ousted. Instead, BoA persevered, and just a few years later BankAmericard turned a profit and grew like a rocketship, transforming how people pay and borrow.

Eventually, BankAmericard became a non-profit consortium called Visa — uniting many banks with competing credit cards. A competing consortium called MasterCharge, later MasterCard, did the same with another set of banks.

Credit cards and payment cards are arguably the most valuable network in the world, with at least $1T of publicly traded market cap (Visa, MasterCard, the banks who issue them, etc)…all starting off in a little town called Fresno, on a random day in September of 1958.

More on how credit cards work today and their history:

And how all of this — and the creation of this powerful network effect — has an impact on how I think about crypto (old tweetstorm from last year): https://x.com/arampell/status/1042226753253437440?s=21

FIN

Consumer Finance Runs on Friction and Inertia

Originally posted as a Twitter thread on June 04, 2019


An example of how friction and inertia extract profits in consumer finance, and how technology solutions/fintech companies will change the game.

“There are now about 5.9 million borrowers who could see their rates drop by at least 75 basis points by refinancing their mortgages…an aggregate of $1.6 billion in potential monthly savings”
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/03/as-mortgage-rates-plunge-millions-more-homeowners-can-benefit-from-refinancing.html

So why don’t consumers do this? It’s WAAAY too complicated for, in this case, an average of $271 per month. Add in the paradox of choice (refinance with whom?), getting stuff notarized, getting both spouses to sign, and hidden fees…and it’s easier to do nothing

Roboadvisors have been around for a while focused on investing assets and optimizing portfolios, but I believe the bigger opportunity is on roboadvising debt — and this has potentially the gravest impact to banks who *make money on friction* (which is all banks!)

There are lots of refinance companies out there, but the biggest opportunity is to do it all automagically for consumers whenever savings can be had (including shifting unsecured debt into secured debt). Refinance as a service, not leadgen to open yet another account

Banks are effectively the biggest “managed marketplaces” out there, between depositors and borrowers. Both sides are getting screwed over by a giant take rate protected by friction (too hard to switch) — with banks earning healthy spreads and record profits

Payment Networks, Protocols, and Crypto

Originally posted as a Twitter thread on September 19, 2018


Visa today has a $328B market cap, bigger than virtually every bank on earth (JPM at $384B is the only one bigger). And yet it started out as a non-profit owned BY banks. How did it become more valuable than its “parents”? https://x.com/VisaNews/status/1042078029114048518

Since Visa intermediates rates between banks (“interchange” between card issuers and merchant acquirers) and clears transactions between issuing banks and acquiring banks, it is the ultimate “central ledger” or platform for finance.

It was originally part of Bank of America, called BankAmericard. But to syndicate this platform beyond BoA, it became a consortium — Visa. Independence (to ensure the central platform didn’t take too much economic rent!) was ensured via non-profit ownership structure

…that is, until 2008 when it went public in the largest US IPO of all time. It reorganized from a non-profit to a for-profit, partially to avoid anti-trust issues (all of the banks get together and decide what to charge merchants…imagine the airlines doing this!)

To me, this is a great example of where/how decentralized networks can preserve true independence (value accrues to network participants vs central player) — and why protocol design, if you will, trumps legal design

Visa is a great and incredibly valuable company. The “protocol” is one of transactional authorization/settlement/clearance. But it was enshrined in a once not-for-profit central actor who today has more value than all but one network participant

Despite a lot of “private blockchain” nonsense out there, this is a great example of how Visa could have or should have been constructed by banks way back when to ensure perpetual independence and inability to capture value as central ledger.

Protocol design matters. And a well thought through protocol is more valuable and protective than lawyers, contracts, and even governments — it will survive all of them.

OS Wallets are an Existential Threat to PayPal

Originally posted as a Twitter thread on June 19, 2018


OS-based wallets like ApplePay pose an existential threat to cloud wallets like PayPal. Compare the experience at TheNorthFace with PayPal vs ApplePay. Eventually HomeDepot, Walmart, etc will embrace. PayPal smart to diversify. Let’s tweet this experience…

Ok, I have the jacket I want. Should I pay with PayPal or ApplePay?

Let’s pay with PayPal! Ok, step 1, leave the website I was just on…

Step 2, now login…

More logging in, step 3

Step 4, more…logging in

Step 5, more!

And there are still more steps. Now compare that to ApplePay, one step, built into the browser — and done

PayPal is hardwired into the checkout flow at many top retailers like http://HomeDepot.com, but unless they build their own mobile OS it will be impossible to bundle this as seamlessly as Apple

Expect widespread adoption of ApplePay *on the web* and for this to have a game changing effect