Category Archives: Real Estate

iBuying and Marketplaces

Originally posted as a Twitter thread on November 02, 2021


few thoughts on iBuying in light of ZG news:
Amazon started off stocking every book it sold, but the vast majority of revenue is now 3P marketplace/FBA (Fulfilled by Amazon). Once AMZN aggregated consumer demand, it started aggregating other sellers and charging commissions

So iBuying is not simply “let’s take lots of principal risk by playing market maker.” Opendoor is aggregating a lot of inventory, which in turn aggregates consumer demand (direct to OD), which then would allow OD to aggregate 3P supply since supply follows consumer demand

the only way to do this is to buy the homes since, as a principal, Opendoor can choose to withhold from MLS and simply list direct. An agent representing a homeowner could try this but…there’s no strategic value to owner in risking lower price for “strategic value to company”

next: cohort math. The real embarrassment to ZG is that their misfire on this business impugns the accuracy of their apparently not very accurate “Zestimate.” But the reason for the misfire, IMHO, is about how cohorts work and age.

let’s say I buy 1000 homes this month for $300M. Avg price $300K. Between commissions, fixes, cost of capital, etc I might be shooting for 50bps profit at the end. But the last 10 homes to sell will make or break me. Why?

by virtue of the fact that they are my LAST 10 to sell, something must be wrong with them. Termites, ghosts, etc. I might need to discount them by 50% to sell them. But that 50% principal impairment wipes out my WHOLE cohort profit/is not realized until the END of cohort!

so basically:
-there is a lot of strategic value to aggregating supply -> aggregating demand to build a marketplace in the biggest asset class in the world. It’s not dumb to try.
-it is very, very hard to get it working, particularly since it will look good until the very end

High Salaries and Expensive Real Estate

Originally posted as a Twitter thread on December 02, 2020


Are high salaries the *cause* or *effect* of expensive housing? In NIMBY-prone areas (hello SF!) where supply is artificially constrained, companies anchored to the geography need to pay a high enough wage to attract talent, which then anchors rent/mortgage payments

Prediction: the current remote-work salary adjustment concept, the Marxian “from each according to his abilities, to each according to his location,” will not last. Why pay people more simply because they choose to live in a more expensive area? Pay them more if they are good!

So looking at lower-cost areas, and paying a discount to prevailing SF wages to get to “parity,” is a crutch of sorts to get to a more sensible end-state: pay a prevailing wage to get the talent. And then let’s see what happens to housing prices…

Home prices will always be based on supply and demand, of course – WFH doesn’t change economics. But “desired location to live” is going to drive that more than “high wage employers” — where those wages could conceptually plummet given increase in supply (global worker pool)

WFH Productivity: Temporary or Permanent?

Originally posted as a Twitter thread on May 21, 2020


Two ways of thinking about WFH productivity:

”It’s temporary”: there is NOTHING else to do, people stuck in homes, kids cannot be shipped off to school or daycare, therefore MORE work gets done + people always accessible…but upon opening, people will start playing hooky

“It’s permanent”: the tools for WFH are great (think Slack/Zoom), meeting length gets collapsed to the core substance (1 hr -> 30 mins etc), less travel/commute, accountability via more trackability…

For small companies, “it’s permanent” could have a seismic change on their financials given real estate costs as a % of revenues. But IMHO jury still out on productivity gains/losses given unique nature of this forcible SAH (stay at home!), not just WFH, experiment

And clarifying the first point, parents whose kids are stuck at home cannot go to the beach / play hooky because they need to watch the kids 🙂 Versus normal times when they could.

Consumer Finance Runs on Friction and Inertia

Originally posted as a Twitter thread on June 04, 2019


An example of how friction and inertia extract profits in consumer finance, and how technology solutions/fintech companies will change the game.

“There are now about 5.9 million borrowers who could see their rates drop by at least 75 basis points by refinancing their mortgages…an aggregate of $1.6 billion in potential monthly savings”
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/03/as-mortgage-rates-plunge-millions-more-homeowners-can-benefit-from-refinancing.html

So why don’t consumers do this? It’s WAAAY too complicated for, in this case, an average of $271 per month. Add in the paradox of choice (refinance with whom?), getting stuff notarized, getting both spouses to sign, and hidden fees…and it’s easier to do nothing

Roboadvisors have been around for a while focused on investing assets and optimizing portfolios, but I believe the bigger opportunity is on roboadvising debt — and this has potentially the gravest impact to banks who *make money on friction* (which is all banks!)

There are lots of refinance companies out there, but the biggest opportunity is to do it all automagically for consumers whenever savings can be had (including shifting unsecured debt into secured debt). Refinance as a service, not leadgen to open yet another account

Banks are effectively the biggest “managed marketplaces” out there, between depositors and borrowers. Both sides are getting screwed over by a giant take rate protected by friction (too hard to switch) — with banks earning healthy spreads and record profits