Tag Archives: payments

Payment Network Effects and Incentives

Originally posted as a Twitter thread on September 27, 2021


There have been many attempts to topple payment network effects by paying users to switch. This almost never works, because (a) more people are motivated by convenience than small amounts of money, and (b) those motivated by money will suck up all the promotional budget ASAP

Good case study today is here, with Venmo, straight to my inbox. $10 of $20 at CVS! CVS doesn’t have 50% gross margins, so Venmo is almost certainly paying. But will “normal” people use this? Will it change behavior in a lasting way?

Whenever a promotion like this happens, the “deal hunters” of the internet rejoice! You can even buy a $20 CVS gift card for $10 + sell it on eBay for $15! See here, on Slickdeals…the promotion is capped (100M people can’t use it, that would be $1B!) and gets quickly depleted

PayPal did this with HomeDepot in 2012, in an attempt to jumpstart their offline business. https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203513604577145140658342670

Promotions aplenty (50% off etc), but it didn’t work…at least not in changing behavior. People (the deal seeking people!) pillaged the promotions and moved on.

A good rule of thumb: a new technology will take off “automatically” if it’s 10x better and 1/10th the cost. Payments offline just work, hard to make them 10x better (vs online, where many opportunities since people don’t memorize their credentials…lots of abandoned carts)

So then there’s cost, where you generate merchant excitement with anything that’s 1/10th the cost, but then fail to persuade consumers to adopt it since they lose their rewards. I often describe interchange as a problem of concentrated benefit (banks/V/MA) and diffuse costs…

Saving 2% on your $5 purchase is simply not compelling enough to sign up for a new payment instrument, or switch payment instruments, even though repeated enough times it’s real money. And the merchant might simply try to keep the savings, versus pass on to consumers.

Look at Target. ~$25B in sales, if this were all credit @ ~2% (it’s not) that would be $500M in fees, or a 20% bump to operating income if they eliminated it. Target has something called their RedCard, which now accounts for >20% of sales by…providing 5% (!!) discounts

So Target *did* switch 20% of people over, which is impressive — but would those people stick if the 5% rebate went away? Maybe…but probably not? (NB: Target made $172M last quarter in a profit sharing agreement with TD for the Target Credit Card)

It *is* valuable to become (and pay for) the default payment in a new wallet with repeat usage that’s “set it and forget it.” Uber, Starbucks, United, Amazon…all have “wallets” with stored value, and credentials, that could theoretically be used elsewhere (e.g., AmazonPay).

The reason I find BNPL interesting is, as I stated here, the ability to produce a parallel network that yields more sales and customer utilization “organically”:

https://x.com/arampell/status/1435692945387048964?s=21 https://x.com/arampell/status/1435692945387048964

Changing behavior is tough, and providing discounts and offers generally doesn’t generate the lasting behavior change companies want. Google learned this lesson with Google Checkout, Visa with Visa Checkout, MasterCard with MasterPass, etc.

13/ So the opportunities and questions are: can you *in a lasting way* appeal to convenience vs cost? If so, a one-time incentive *might* be just fine. Otherwise — it’s probably wasted ammunition against the impenetrable fortress of interchange.

Why BNPL is an Early Threat to all of Payments

Originally posted as a Twitter thread on September 08, 2021


Why is “Buy Now, Pay Later” (BNPL) an early threat to trillions of dollars of market cap – Visa (almost $500B), MasterCard ($350B), card issuing banks, acquiring banks/services (Fiserv, FIS, Global Payments, etc)?

2/ Behind every card transaction there are FIVE parties: consumer -> issuing bank -> network (V/MA) -> acquiring bank -> merchant. The middle three get zero data on what items (“SKUs”) are being bought. Short video I made here:

BNPL makes no sense for, say, a $5 transaction at Walgreens. But do you want to get a 2 meter long paper receipt which you need to return that $5 item? Because of the architecture, there’s no way for the issuer to receive that AND the merchant doesn’t want to give it to them

Because the issuer, network, and merchant acquirer do not see SKU-level detail, financing is just “cash advance” and “everything else”
What if a merchant wants to lower the rate for SOME items? (Sell more!) What if a *manufacturer* wants to lower it across merchants? No can do

This what makes BNPL so interesting. It’s a **parallel** network, with SKU level information, that bypasses the issuing bank, card network, and merchant acquirer. It’s just the consumer, the merchant, AND (this is exciting!) a new participant: the product manufacturer!

Let’s say Samsung wants to create an installment payment plan for their new $1000 phone (b/c lower pricing sells more stuff!). How do they do this at, say, Walmart and Target and Amazon? When everyone has a different kind of credit card and those issuers don’t see SKUs? BNPL!

Right now this parallel network is being used for installments / customized financing – the clear product-market need and the hole the “one size fits all because of no SKU-data and five parties” created. But adding SKU-level info and manufacturers is a HUGE unlock for more

There have been many attempts to build a competing payment network (eg MCX: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Merchant_Customer_Exchange) but they failed to address a consumer need. BNPL has both consumer demand and merchant demand, albeit for a subset of transactions

Over time, there’s no reason why any transaction – even the $5 Walgreens one – cannot be run over the BNPL rails, which are signing up merchants and consumers at an aggressive clip. Rather than a financing carrot, it might be a discount carrot, a warranty carrot, etc

Walmart et al created MCX because they hate (understandably so!) paying ~2% interchange fees. But those fees are protected by a very very powerful network effect. Walmart tried playing chicken in Canada — cutting off Visa cards in 2016 — and lost:

https://www.cnbc.com/2016/06/13/walmart-canada-to-stop-accepting-visa-says-fees-too-high.html

So you really need a *ubiquitous parallel network* with *consumer benefit* in order to go cold turkey against the current oligopoly and not lose sales. BNPL is just that. Merchants already use it, consumers already use it, and SKU data passes freely.

As the mobile phone increasingly becomes the consumer wallet, and as merchant payment terminals become smarter, you can also imagine a world where payments (and loans) automatically shift to the lowest cost/highest benefit provider…more here:

Open-loop payments (the V/MA system) are one of the greatest network effects of all time, and have created and *captured* tons of value. The moat is immense. But BNPL and mobile wallets are creating the first market-based (not regulation-based) cracks in the fortress.
FIN